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E.U. State Aid Developments in 2003:
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Dennis Oswell and Esfandiar Vahida*
I. INTRODUCTION
There was a time when observers had the impression that European
companies could think of no better gift from the government than a subsidy
of some sort. Scrutiny of such governmental largess at the E.U. level was
perceived as lax and any consequences for violating the E.U. competition
rules against such handouts were seen as remote and timid.' Times have
changed. As the European Commission (the "Commission") stiffens its
resolve to police and punish unlawful State intervention in the marketplace,
governmental subsidies to favored undertakings, broadly referred to in the
European Union as "State aid," are fast becoming gifts that companies
sometimes wish they had not received.2
* European Union Competition Law Attorneys, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Brussels,
Belgium.
1 For a more detailed analysis, see Kelyn Bacon, The Concept of State Aid: The
Developing Jurisprudence in the European and UK Courts, 24 EuR. COMPETITION L. REv.
54 2003).
The term "State aid" is actually broader than the concept of a government subsidy,
going well beyond simple cash transfers from a government to a favored company to cover
"any aid" that comes from "state resources in any form whatsoever." CONSOLIDATED
VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Dec. 24, 2002, art. 87,
O.J. (C 325) 67 (2002) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. The European Court of Justice elaborated on
this difference by saying that:
The concept of an aid is nevertheless wider than that of a subsidy because it embraces not
only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also interventions which, in various
forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and
which, without, therefore, being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in
character and have the same effect.
Case 30/59, Steenkolenmijnen v. High Authority, 1961 E.C.R. 1, 19.
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Under E.U. competition rules, 3 any advantage granted by the State to a
company that distorts (or threatens to distort) competition in the European
Union and which is capable of affecting trade between E.U. Member States
constitutes unlawful aid unless it meets certain conditions which have
4become more detailed and more systematically enforced in recent years.
The characterization of State aid granted in a straightforward manner
as unlawful, e.g., through the grant of a loan at an artificially low rate, is
relatively unproblematic, but the Commission is more and more often
scrutinizing suspected State aid in unobvious and novel situations. In doing
so, the Commission has been using the tests applied in straightforward
cases and has adapted them to the situations under review (to use a French
expression-c 'est dans les vieilles marmites qu 'on fait la meilleure soupe).5
The sophistication of the criteria used to characterize governmental
assistance as unlawful State aid has made it risky for aid givers and
recipients to predict whether an advantage granted by the State can safely
pass the review of the Commission. Moreover, once a measure has been
cleared (or blocked) by the Commission, as shown in the judgments
reviewed below, a real risk exists that the European Courts6 will find the
Commission's decision defective. This uncertainty, combined with the
threat of recovery and reimbursement obligations, and the heavy political
context surrounding State aid cases and Commission inquiries,7 make it
hazardous to be a grantor, a beneficiary or a regulator in the State aid
business.
One of the principal instruments used to characterize aid is the market
economy investor principle ("MEIP"), and 2003 was a year of "tweaking"
the MEIP for application in new contexts.
II. APPLICATION OF THE MARKET ECONOMY INVESTOR PRINCIPLE IN
THREE NOVEL FACTUAL SITUATIONS
The MEIP is used to characterize the existence of State aid within the
meaning of Article 87 of the European Community Treaty ("EC") and, at
the same time, aims at ensuring equality of treatment between State-owned
or controlled companies and private sector competitors pursuant to Article
295 EC.8 In other words, the MEIP test is designed to address situations
3 Articles 87-88 of the EC Treaty provide the legal basis of the E.U. competence in this
field. EC TREATY, supra note 2, arts. 87-88.
4 For a more detailed analysis, see Bacon, supra note 1, at 54-61.
5 Translation: "It is in old pots that one makes the best soup."
6 The Court of First Instance ("CFI") and the European Court of Justice ("ECJ").
7 See e.g., Case C-110/02, Commission v. Council, (Dec. 11, 2003), at http://
europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/CuriaServlet?curiaLink=%261ang%3 DEN%26ident%
3D79968788C 19020110%26model%3Ddoc curia.
8 A standard expression of this test in the "straightforward" context of capital injection by
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where a public authority acts (or claims to act) as a market participant,
engaging in commercial activities in the same manner as a private
undertaking.
In assessing alleged State aid measures under the MEIP, the
Commission and the Community Courts assess whether, from the
standpoint of the alleged State aid grantor, a private investor in similar
circumstances would have provided the assistance in question;9 or whether,
from the standpoint of the alleged State aid recipient, the recipient received
a benefit it would not have obtained under normal market conditions.1 0
Where the State is determined to have acted in a manner similar to that of a
"market economy investor," i.e., providing the aid is seen as a sensible
business decision that would likely have been made by a private investor on
similar terms and conditions (i.e., a private party motivated by profit and
unconcerned by broader governmental social objectives such as artificially
bolstering employment or favoring a national champion), the MEIP is
satisfied and the assistance in question will be characterized as a rational
commercial investment rather than as unlawful State aid. 11
Judgments issued in 2003 by the European Court of Justice ("ECJ")
have applied the MEIP in several situations where it had not, or not as
clearly, been applied before: (a) when the grantor of alleged State aid
operates in a reserved market, (b) where the aid recipient provides a public
service, and (c) from the point of view of an indirect beneficiary of the aid.
the State is as follows: "in order to determine whether ... measures are in the nature of
State aid, it is necessary to consider whether in similar circumstances a private investor of a
size comparable to that of the bodies administering the public sector might have provided
capital of such an amount." Case C-305/89, Italian Republic v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-
01603, at para. 19.
9 Case 234/84, Belgium v. Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 2263; Case C-303/88, Italy v.
Commission, 1991 ECR 1-4437; Joined Cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92, Spain v.
Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4103.
10 Case C-39/94, SFEI v. La Poste, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3547, at para. 60.
"1 See e.g., Case T-98/00, Linde AG v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 11-396 1.
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A. Application of the MEIP when the Grantor of Alleged Aid Operates in
a Reserved Market: Chronopost and others v UFEX and others
12
In Chronopost, the ECJ clarified the conditions of the application of
the MEIP when the grantor of an advantage operates in a "reserved
market," (i.e., one which lacks a private sector analogue).
In the case, La Poste (the French post office) provided logistical and
commercial assistance to Chronopost, a subsidiary operating in the private
sector. The French postal service is an entity governed by public law and
had no equivalent in the private sector because it possessed a
comprehensive, nation-wide postal delivery network that "would never
have been created by a private undertaking. '1 3 This made it impossible to
directly compare La Poste with a private investor, thereby hindering the
application of the MEIP. The question on the minds of governments,
companies and practitioners alike was whether the Court would attempt to
apply some sort of MEIP test to analyze the alleged aid given by La Poste
to Chronopost given the absence of a private sector comparator.
The ECJ judged that: "in the absence of any possibility of comparing
the situation of La Poste with that of a private group of undertakings not
operating in a reserved sector, 'normal market conditions,' which are
necessarily hypothetical, must be assessed by reference to the objective and
verifiable elements which are available.'
14
The "objective and verifiable elements" to be used when characterizing
aid as unlawful or not were: (1) whether it is established that the price
charged properly covers all the additional, variable costs incurred by La
Poste in providing the logistical and commercial assistance to Chronopost,
12 Joined Cases C-83/01 P, C-93/01 P and C-94/01 P, Chronopost SA, La Poste and
French Republic v. Union Fran~aise de l'Express (UFEX), DHL Int'l, Federal Express Int'l
(France) and CRIE, at paras. 38-41 (Jul. 3, 2003), at http://europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/
CuriaServletcuriaLink=%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D79969296C 19010094%26model%3
Ddoccuria; Case C-355/00, Freskot/Elliniko Dimosio (May 22, 2003), at
http://europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/
CuriaServlet?curiaLink=%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D79969477C 19000355%26model%3
Ddoccuria. Freskot, judged on May 22, 2003, before Chronopost, is consistent with
Chronopost, although in a less clear way. In Freskot, the grantor of the alleged State aid was
the ELGA, the Greek organization for agricultural insurance, a private entity wholly owned
by the State and financed by a special insurance contribution levied by the tax authority.
There was no equivalent for the ELGA in the private sector, at least regarding risks for
which coverage would not be profitable. The alleged aid concerned whether a compulsory
insurance scheme operated by the ELGA constituted State aid to Greek farmers. The ECJ
indicated that the existence of aid must be assessed by reference to the "actual economic cost
of the benefits provided by the ELGA under the compulsory [i.e., not provided on the free
market] insurance scheme, if indeed such a cost can be calculated."
13 Joined Cases C-83/01 P, C-93/01 P and C-94/01 P, Chronopost, at para. 36 (May 22,
2003), at http://europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/CuriaServletcuriaLink= 261ang /3DEN
26ident%3D79969296C 19010094%26model%3Ddoc curia.
14 Id. at para. 38.
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an appropriate contribution to the fixed costs arising from use of the postal
network and an adequate return on the capital investment in so far as it is
used for Chronopost's competitive activity; and (2) whether those elements
have been underestimated or fixed in an arbitrary fashion.'
5
In other words, the ECJ did not even look for a "second best" market
economy investor equivalent of the French postal service and instead went
directly to a review of whether a certain contractual relationship made
economic sense. The ECJ's analysis mainly focused on "objective
elements" of assessment of the economic rationality of the measure at issue
in order to determine whether the measure satisfied the MEIP. This
approach had been applied before, 6 but not as clearly as it was in
Chronopost.
The ECJ had, in a previous judgment involving La Poste, adopted a
position quite different to that which it elaborated in Chronopost, ruling that
there should be an analysis based upon the classic elaboration of the MEIP,
namely-whether the recipient undertaking receives an economic
advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market
conditions.' 7 Chronopost says that even where a lack of a private sector
comparator prevents this question from being answered, there nonetheless
remains scope for applying the MEIP, as described above. Moreover,
whereas in Chronopost and in other relatively rare cases where State aid
was alleged in the price of the provision of goods or services provided by a
State controlled entity, the MEIP has usually been applied from the point of
view of the grantor of the goods or services in question.18 In so doing the
ECJ is signaling that under certain circumstances it will respect an
economic decision of a State controlled entity so as long as it makes
economic sensefrom the point of view of that State controlled entity. 19
15 Id. at para. 40.
16 Case C-56/93 Belgium v. Commission, 1996 E.C.R. 1-723, at paras. 27-28, 30, 37 (the
"objective element" used by the ECJ to characterize the absence of aid was the "conditions
of competition," i.e., competition in the ammonia market presented by imports from non-
member countries); Joined cases 67/85, 68/85 and 70/85, Van der Kooy v. Commission,
1988 E.C.R. 219, at para. 30 (the objective element used was "the need to resist competition
on the same market from other sources of energy the price of which was competitive," and
competition was assessed based on price levels and the cost of conversion of users to
alternative sources of energy); Case T-98/00, Linde, 2002 E.C.R. 11-3961 (the objective
elements taken into account were the cost of the service provided by the other party to a
contract and the fact that conditions were not less favorable than under a previous contract
replaced by the new arrangements).
17 Case C-39/94 Syndicat Frangais de l'Express Int'l (SFEI) v. La Poste, 1996 E.C.R. 1-
03547, at paras. 58, 61-62; see also Case T-98/00, Linde, 2002 E.C.R. 11-3961, at para. 39.




19 This approach is consistent with the ECJ's rulings on the financing of public services
discussed below, where the satisfaction of the MEIP is verified from the point of view of the
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The review of the existence of possible State aid from the point of
view of the beneficiary would, in the case of Chronopost, have amounted to
prohibiting a measure as illegal State aid simply because of the different
cost structure of the State controlled entity vis-A-vis a private sector
operator. Therefore, such a review would have discriminated against the
State owned entity, contrary to Article 295 EC, by effectively preventing it
from acting in a reasonable commercial manner. Had the recipient
perspective of the MEIP been applied, the State controlled entity would
have to imitate a private sector entity to satisfy the MEIP, even though no
comparable private sector entity existed.
Putting this point aside, the judgment in Chronopost appears open
ended in that the criterion of the absence of an equivalent market economy
investor for the grantor, which triggered recourse to a cost analysis, is a
problem also encountered in other situations. The outcome of a pending
case involving the Agricultural Bank of Greece ("BAG") is interesting
because the opinion of Advocate General M.L.A. Geelhoed does not follow
Chronopost.20 The alleged unlawful State aid concerned the provision of
loans to farmers by BAG, which is controlled by the Greek State and is an
entity without an equivalent in the private sector.21 The Advocate General
considers that since the loans were granted at conditions that private banks
would not have found acceptable, they do not satisfy the MEIP, thus
comparing a unique entity (BAG) with second best equivalents (commercial
banks).22 It may be that the existence of a commoditized market for the
provision of loans justifies different legal treatment compared to the
provision of goods or services in the special context of the Chronopost
case.
23
In addition to the application of the MEIP to aid provided from
companies operating in a reserved sector in the form of provision of goods
or services to a private sector entity, as indicated above, 2003 also saw the
issue of the application of the MEIP arise in a symmetrical situation - State
compensation to companies that provide goods or services to the State
provider of public services (whose costs are analyzed) and not firom the point of view of the
public entity paying for such services.
20 Case C-278/00, Greece v. Commission, at para. 127 (Sept. 25, 2003), at
http://www.europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/
CuriaServlet?curiaLink=%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D79969074C 19000278%26model%3
Ddoc curia (Opinion of Advocate General M.L.A. Geelhoed).
21 Id. BAG is described by the Advocate General as the only bank operating exclusively
in the agricultural sector. Moreover, where a commercial bank considering making a loan
would limit its analysis to the commercial merits of said loan, the BAG has been described
as entrusted with a "mission" based on the "greater interests of the agricultural sector." Id. at
paras. 122, 127.22 Id. at para. 127.
23 id.
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while discharging a public service obligation.
B. Application of the MEIP to the financing of public service obligations:
Altmark
24
The ECJ's Altmark judgment has enjoyed a dominant position in last
year's E.U. State aid literature and commentaries. The case was about the
grant of a license to operate a scheduled bus transport service in a German
region to a company called Altmark. The provision of the transport service
constituted the discharge of a public service obligation (in this case the
provision of public bus transportation). The case was brought to the ECJ
through a request for a preliminary ruling and the ECJ reviewed the issue of
whether subsidies granted by public authorities to make up for the costs
involved in executing a public service obligation constitute unlawful State
aid.
1. The three competing views
There were three competing legal views involved in this debate.
First, there was Advocate General Ldger's opinion.25  In his
conclusions in Altmark, Advocate General Ldger considered that the fact
that an advantage granted by public authorities comes in compensation for
the discharge of a public service obligation by its beneficiary is not relevant
to the characterization of that advantage as State aid. This fact, according
to the Advocate General, is only relevant to the analysis of the compatibility
of the aid with the common market. According to Advocate General Lger,
a "gross" advantage can constitute State aid, even if the "net" amount
(taking into account the cost of public service obligations to their provider)
does not constitute an advantage (this approach is referred to as the "State
aid approach").26 This approach would have burdened E.U. Member States
with the obligation to notify for approval to the Commission every measure
that involved the financing of a public service.
Second, there was Advocate General Tizzano's opinion. 27 The ECJ's
position before the Altmarkjudgment was reflected in the Ferring judgment
24 Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungsprasidium Magdeburg v.
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, and Oberbundesanwalt beim
Bundesverwaltungsgericht, (Jul. 24, 2003), at http://europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/
CuriaServlet?curiaLink=%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D79969275C 19000280%26model%3
Ddoc curia.
25 Greece, (Sept. 25, 2003) at http://www.europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/
CuriaServlet?curiaLink-%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D79969074C 1 9000278%26model%3
Ddoc curia.
26 Id. at para. 94.
27 Case C-53/00, Ferring SA and Agence centrale des organismes de s6curit6 sociale
(ACOSS), 2001 E.C.R. 1-9067.
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and followed Advocate General Tizzano's position. In that judgment, the
ECJ decided that an exemption of a tax (on direct sales of medicine)
amounted to State aid only where this advantage exceeds the cost of
providing certain public service obligations (i.e., there is State aid when the
"net" amount constitutes an advantage - this approach is referred to as the
"compensation approach"). 28 Advocate General Uger considered that this
view amounted to transposing the MEIP to the financing of public services
(although the Ferring decision and the conclusions of Advocate General
Tizzano do not mention the MEIP expressly).
Third was Advocate General Jacob's opinion.29 In his conclusions in
GEMO, Advocate General Jacobs indicated that when there is a clear quid
pro quo between general interest obligations and their financing measures,
then the compensation approach should apply; and that when there is no
such quidpro quo, the State aid approach should apply. Advocate General
Jacobs expressly refers to the application of the MEIP (which he calls the
"private investor test").
The winners appear to have been Advocates General Jacobs and
Tizzano. In its Altmark judgment, the ECJ ruled that financial support,
which merely represents compensation for carrying out public service
obligations imposed by Member States, does not have the characteristics of
State aid because such support does not constitute an "advantage."3 ° While
in Ferring, the absence of over-compensation (i.e., paying the provider of
the public service more than the actual cost incurred in executing the
obligation) was sufficient for a finding of absence of State aid, in Altmark,
the ECJ detailed this condition and set forth the following four sub-
conditions that must be satisfied in order to escape characterization as
unlawful State aid for compensation provided by a government in exchange
for providing a public service:
1.The recipient undertaking is actually required to discharge public
service obligations and those obligations have been clearly defined;
2.The parameters on the basis of which the compensation is
calculated have been established beforehand in an objective and
transparent manner;
3. The compensation does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or
part of the costs incurred in discharging the public service
obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a
28 Altmark, supra note 24, at para. 7 (Opinion of Advocate General L~ger).
29 Case C-126/01, Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie v. GEMO SA,
(Apr. 30, 2002), at http://www.europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/CuriaServlet?curiaLink=
%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D79979569C19010126%26model%3Ddoccuria (Opinion of
Advocate General Jacobs).
30 Altmark, supra note 24, at para. 87.
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reasonable profit for discharging those obligations, and
4.Where the undertaking which is to discharge public service
obligations is not chosen in a public procurement procedure (i.e.,
via a transparent open bidding process), the level of compensation
needed has to have been determined on the basis of an analysis of
the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately
equipped so as to be able to meet the necessary public service
requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations,
taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for
discharging the obligations.31
Condition I above defines the scope of application of the Altmark
ruling-analyzing aid provided in exchange for the discharge of a public
service obligation. Conditions 2 to 4 apply the MEIP to these
circumstances.
It is noteworthy that the ECJ appears not to have picked up Advocate
General Leger's opinion that the MEIP is reserved exclusively for situations
where the aid recipient carries on an "economic activity" and that the MEIP
cannot apply where the government exercises its official or sovereign
powers, such as where it provides public services.32 The judgment therefore
may mean that certain instances of the exercise of official powers are
subject to the application of the MEIP, or that the grant of a subsidy does
not constitute the exercise of an official power. Sadly, the Court did not
take the opportunity to define what official powers are or the scope of any
"hardcore" official powers where the MEIP may not apply. A clearer
definition of official powers would be welcome.
2. Follow-up Legislation on Services of General Economic Interest
E.U. legislation on services of general interest (i.e., public services)
had been suspended while the Altmark case was pending. As a result of the
judgment, the Commission is currently contemplating the adoption of
guidelines or legislation regarding compensation for the cost of services of
general interest based on the four criteria set forth in the Altmark
judgment.33  The Commission is also contemplating the adoption of an
31 Id. at para. 95.
32 Altmark, (Jan. 14, 2003) (the Advocate General Lger mentions compulsory social
security schemes or compulsory education as examples of Official or soverign powers to
which the MEIP cannot be applied), at http://europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/
CuriaServlet?curiaLink=%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D79969885C I 9000280%26model%3
Ddoc curia.
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instrument clarifying the conditions that need to be satisfied for State aid to
be compatible with the EC Treaty that would, inter alia, define over-
compensation for the provision of public services. Finally, the Commission
is working on a ossible block exemption regulation for aid to services of
general interest.
3
C. Existence of Aid to an Indirect Beneficiary
In SIM 2 Multimedia SpA, 35 the ECJ reviewed the existence of aid to
an indirect beneficiary. In the facts of the case, a parent company that
allegedly received unlawful State aid hived off its most profitable business
activities into a subsidiary ("SIM Multimedia") after the Commission
launched a formal State aid investigation. The shares of SIM Multimedia,
were subsequently sold by the parent under investigation to a third party.36
The Commission found that illegal aid was indeed granted to the
parent corporation and ordered that the aid be partly recovered from SIM
Multimedia even though it was purchased by third parties and no longer
belonged to its original parent. 7  The ECJ annulled the Commission
decision in this case because the Commission had not adequately
considered whether the initial beneficiary of the unlawful State aid (i.e.,
SIM Multimedia's parent) had retained the benefit of aid. Specifically, the
Court stated that the fact that the shares in the subsidiary were apparently
sold at market price indicates that the seller, SIM Multimedia's original
parent, "retained the benefit of the aid received from the sale of SIM
Multimedia at market price. 38 The purchase price presumably would have
reflected the value of any advantage retained by SIM Multimedia, and if
this was the case then it would be inappropriate to attempt recovery from
the indirect beneficiary.
The assessment of whether the sale of SIM Multimedia was at a
market price constitutes an application of the MEIP to the sale of shares
from a direct beneficiary of unlawful State aid to a third party. Since the
34 Mario Monti, Speech to the British Chamber of Commerce on New Developments in
State Aid, Brussels (Dec. 1, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/
start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-actin.gettxt=-gt&dc=SPEECH/3/64101RAPID&g=EN&dispay=
35 Joined Cases C-328/99 and C-399/00, Italian Republic and SIM 2 Multimedia SpA v.
Commission, at paras. 75, 95 (May 8, 2003), at http://www.europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/
CuriaServlet?curiaLink=%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D79969491 C 19990328%26model%3
Ddoc curia.
36 Although the judgment expressly states, "the question arises whether [the subsidiary]
should also be considered as having been a beneficiary of the aid"," the rest of the judgment
is not clear, and the indirect beneficiary of aid can alternatively be presented as a mere party
from whom aid is recovered. Id. at para. 75.3 7 Id. at para. 18.
38 Id. at para. 8.
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ECJ mentions that SIM Multimedia, as a subsidiary of a recipient of
unlawful State aid, could itself be characterized as a beneficiary of unlawful
State aid, the review of whether its shares were sold at a market price could
lead to a novel conclusion. The buyer of the shares has itself become the
beneficiary of the unlawful State aid. This is unusual since normally the
MEIP is applied to the relationship between the State, or a State-controlled
entity, and the direct beneficiary of aid.
It is true that a few decisions had in the past disregarded or appeared to
disregard a direct receiver of aid and focused on an indirect beneficiary.
However, they concerned direct beneficiaries who had no economic
activity, and were therefore not "undertakings" for purposes of E.U. State
aid law, whereas the indirect beneficiaries did carry out an economic
activity. 39 The new element found in the SIM Multimedia case is that the
direct and indirect beneficiaries of aid are both undertakings for purposes of
E.U. State aid law and that the MEIP is able to be applied further
"downstream" than previously declared.
The above case must be distinguished from Verlipak, where the ECJ
ruled that the Commission was correct to take into account the effect of a
clause by which the borrower of funds from the State passed the funds to a
third party who was subsequently found to be the beneficiary of aid.40
Whereas in SIM 2 Multimedia SpA, the MEIP appears to have been applied
both between the State and the direct beneficiary and between the direct and
the indirect beneficiary, in Verlipak, the MEIP is applied once, between the
State and the ultimate beneficiary.
In order to prevent the risk present in SIM 2 Multimedia SpA of finding
aid at every level where the benefits of the aid trickle, the ECJ could have
simply ruled that the "downstream" parties taking advantage of aid were to
be considered as parties from whom aid can be recovered rather than
beneficiaries of aid. The difference would have been that the burdensome
MEIP would not apply in commercial relations between unsuspecting
private entities. This alternative view can apply only if the rules on
recovery from "downstream" parties are clarified, which, as explained
below, is not yet the case.
III. RECOVERY AND REIMBURSEMENT OF UNLAWFUL AID
E.U. Member States have an obligation to recover unlawful aid in
accordance with their national laws.4 ' The Commission has recently set up
39 Case C-156/98, Federal Republic of Germany v. Commission, 2000 E.C.R. 1-06857, at
paras. 27-28.
40 Belgium, at paras. 57-61 (July 3, 2002), at http://europa.eu.int/servletportail/
CuriaServlet?curiaLink=%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D79979080C19000457%26model%3
Ddoc curia.
41 Altmark, at para. 95 (Jul. 24, 2003), at http://europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/
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a dedicated unit in charge of enforcing recovery decisions,42 but it is unclear
who are the losers and winners of aid recovery. More specifically, there is
uncertainty in the case law regarding who should reimburse unlawful aid,
and the rights of parties contributing to a tax or charge levied specially to
finance the underlying grant of aid, once that aid is declared unlawful.
A. Recovery from an Indirect Beneficiary of Aid--Cases of the Sale of
Assets or Shares of the Direct Beneficiary of Aid
As indicated above, the ECJ has judged that unlawful State aid can be
recovered from a company that purchased assets from another company that
directly benefited from State aid, if the assets were sold at a non-market
price or as a result of a procedure that was not open and transparent.43
What the ECJ has not done is clearly define its position regarding whether,
in the case of a sale of shares by a direct beneficiary of unlawful aid, the aid
must be recovered from the seller of the shares, or from the company whose
shares have been sold (or even from the buyer of shares, which the Court
has yet to order).44
In a June 2003 opinion,45 Advocate General Tizzano argued that in the
case of a share deal, aid should be recovered from the initial beneficiary of
the aid because this is the only way of eliminating the distortion of
competition created by the underlying grant of aid. This solution would
apply regardless of whether the shares were sold at market price.
The uncertainty as to whether the seller of shares in a company that
benefited from aid, or the company whose shares have been sold, or even
the buyer of the shares, is ultimately liable for the repayment of State aid is
harmful to the acquisition of companies. Clarification by the ECJ would
therefore be welcome.
B. Can the Council 'Whitewash' Aid Found Unlawful by the Commission
in Order to Avoid Repayment by its Beneficiary?




43 Italian Republic, (May 8, 2003), at http://www.europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/
CuriaServlet?curiaLink=%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D7996949 1C 9990328%26model%3
Ddoc curia.
44 Opinion of Advocate General Antonio Tizzano, Case C-277/00, Germany v.
Commission (Jun. 19, 2003), at http://www.europa.eu.int/servlet/portaiU/CuriaServlet?
curiaLink=%261ang% 3DFR%26ident%3D79969380C19000277%26model%3Ddoc curia
("[d]ans aucun pr&dent, la Cour n 'a en revanche fait reposer I'obligation de restitution
dans le chef de l 'acqugreur, dont la responsabilitg a &t au contraire express~ment exclue en
cas de vente au prix du march6 (arrt Banks).")
45 Id.
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surrounding State aid cases. The outcome of the case in question would
determine whether a principle of "preemption" exists in E.U. institutional
rules that would prevent inconsistency between Commission and Council
decisions.
In Commission v Council,46 the Commission ordered the repayment of
unlawful aid granted by Portugal to pig farmers. A Council decision (taken
pursuant to the third subparagraph of Article 88(2) EC, which empowers
the Council, where justified by exceptional circumstances, to declare
compatible with the common market an aid which a Member State is
granting or intends to grant) authorized Portugal to make payments to a
group of Portuguese pig farmers equivalent in amount to aid which those
farmers had already received but had been required to repay following the
Commission decision. The case is still pending before the ECJ, but
Advocate General Jacob's opinion in this case favors preventing the
Council from frustrating a Commission decision in this manner.
According to Advocate General Jacobs: (a)the Council cannot, under
the third subparagraph of Article 88(2) EC, adopt a decision in respect of
aid which has previously been the subject of a negative Commission
decision; (b) the Council cannot authorize aid which has as its object and
effect to assist its recipients to repay aid previously the subject of a negative
Commission decision, and (c) hardship to the beneficiaries of the original
aid arising out of the obligation to repay that aid does not constitute in itself
an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of the third subparagraph
of Article 88(2). When ordered by the Commission, recovery must be
pursued by the State in question even if it leads to the failure of the
undertaking to which the aid was granted. The only defense available to the
Member State is that it is absolutely impossible for it to recover the aid.47
The judgment in this case will be crucial in either stopping or
encouraging a recent tendency noticed by Advocate General Jacobs, namely
to use Article 88(2) EC to authorize an aid which serves to reimburse its
recipients for having to repay another aid previously subject to a negative
Commission decision.
C. Interest Applicable to the Repayment of Unlawful Aid
The Commission has clarified in a Communication48 that in any future
decisions ordering recovery of unlawful State aid, it will apply the relevant
46 Case C-1 10/02, Commission v. Council, (Dec. 11, 2003), at http://
europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/CuriaServlet?curiaLink=%26ang%3DEN%26ident%3D799687
88C19020110%26model%3Ddoc curia.
47 Id. at para. 54.
48 Commission communication on the interest rate to be applied when aid granted
unlawfully is being recovered, 2003 O.J. (C 110) 08, 21, available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/archive/2003/c_ 11020030508en.html.
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interest rate49  on a compound basis calculated annually. This
communication is meant to put an end to a doubt that affected the execution
of recovery decisions where it was discussed whether the interest rate
should be applied on a simple basis or on a compound basis.
D. Entitlement to the Repayment of Charges Levied by a Member State to
Finance Unlawful State Aid
Until recently, there was uncertainty as to whether the levying of a
charge dedicated to a particular purpose (i.e., a "parafiscal charge")
constituted a component of an aid measure. The lawfulness of the method
used to finance aid was thought to be a mere matter of national law drawing
inferences from the prohibition of aid.50 Several recent judgments have
contradicted that view and stated that the method of financing aid can itself
constitute aid.
In Van Calster,51 the Commission reviewed a notified aid scheme to
finance an animal health and production fund and found it to be compatible
with the common market. Some of the aid's financing provisions were
retroactive and intended to finance prior, unlawful aid. The aid was
financed through levies on certain operators in the meat industry. In a
decision that was probably flawed due to a lack of review of the
compatibility of the method of the aid's financing, the E.U. Commission
declared the aid compatible with the common market. The ECJ ruled that if
an aid measure, of which the method of financing is an integral part, has
been implemented in breach of the obligation to notify, national courts must
in principle order reimbursement of charges or contributions levied
specifically for the pu ose of financing that aid. This position has been
confirmed in Enrisorse.
It had already been established that charges levied by a Member State
49 The relevant interest rate for the recovery of unlawful aid is the reference rate used in
the calculation of the net grant equivalent of regional aid measures. Letter from the
Commission to the Member States (Feb. 22, 1995), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/
comm/competition/stateaid/legislation/txint-en.html.
50 Joined Cases C-34/01 & C-38/01, Enirisorse SpA v. Ministero delle Finanze, at paras.
171-174 (Nov. 7, 2002), at http://www.europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/
CuriaServlet?curiaLink=%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D79978892C 19010037%26model%3
Ddoccuria (Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl).
51 Joined Cases C-261/01 & C-262/01, Belgische Staat v Eugene Van Calster, Felix
Cleeren (C-261/01) and Belgische Staat v Openbaar Slachthuis NV (C-262/01), 2003 O.J. (C
304) 5, at para. 54 (In order to avoid criticizing the Commission's probably imperfect
review, the ECJ had to interpret the Commission's finding of compatibility as a decision that
had not approved the aid's provisions on retroactive financing).
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in breach of Community law must not be repaid if it is shown that the
person required to pay such charges has actually passed them on to other
persons.53 This principle was refined in Weber's Wine World where, in
connection with a duty on beverages that was found to constitute State aid,
the ECJ judged that E.U. law precludes national rules which refuse
repayment of a charge incompatible with Community law on the sole
ground that the charge was passed on to third parties, without requiring that
the degree of unjust enrichment that repayment of the charge would entail
for the taxable person be established. 54 In other words, it is not possible to
deny reimbursement of unlawful duties to beverage sellers by claiming that
sellers have passed on the duty to buyers without first establishing the
extent to which this has in fact happened, and that therefore reimbursement
would cause unjust enrichment of the sellers.
In contradiction to the above line of cases, the CFI has recently ruled
that a levy charged on cotton, and entirely dedicated to finance aid granted
by an association of Greek cotton ginners, was merely a State aid financing
method and not itself State aid, and could not be declared compatible or
incompatible with the common market by the Commission. 55
All the above does not make life particularly easy for the grantor of aid
or the beneficiary. It appears that the multiple tests and controls add
complexity to economic decisions of the State or State controlled entities
which do not burden decisions by private entities. Although the idea is
systematically rejected by case law, 6 this difference of treatment probably
constitutes a breach of Article 295 EC. By contrast to the above
restrictions, some of the developments in State aid procedural rules in 2003,
concerning the requirement for the Commission to state the reasons for its
decisions, may provide limited comfort to the grantor or the beneficiary of
challenged aid.
53 Joined Cases C-192/95 and C-218/95, Comateb and Others v. Directeur Gdndral des
Douanes et Droits Indirects, 1997 E.C.R. 1-165, at paras. 20-2 1.
54 Case C-147/01, Weber's Wine World and Others v Abgabenberufungskommission
Wien, at para. 98 (Oct. 2, 2003), at http://www.europa.eu.int/servlet/portailU
CuriaServlet?curiaLink=%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D79968997C 19010147%26model%3
Ddoc curia.
55 Case T-148/00, Panhellenic Union of Cotton Ginners & Exp. v. Commission, at paras.
11-12, 65 (Oct. 16, 2003), at http://www.europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/
CuriaServlet?curiaLink=-%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D79968983T 19000148%26model%3
Ddoccuria.
56 See, e.g., Joined Cases T-1 16/01 and 118/01, P & 0 European Ferries (Vizcaya), SA v.
Commission, 2003 O.J. (C 251) 10, at paras. 151-52.
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IV. COURT SANCTION OF THE COMMISSION'S LACK OF SUFFICIENT
STATEMENT OF REASONS
The ECJ in 2003 annulled several Commission decisions finding
unlawful State aid on grounds of insufficient reasoning.
A. Lack of Sufficient Statement of Reasons Regarding the Application of
the MEIP
In WestLB,57 the CFI judged that without having an obligation to
provide an exhaustive account of the mathematical reasoning followed, the
Commission must do a better job explaining the essential considerations
which lead to its choice of a certain rate of return used in order to determine
whether the MEIP test was satisfied. The Commission, among other
examples of imprecise wording, referred to certain sources of information
in its decision without setting out their content and explaining their
consequence on its decision, and had also referred to its "own experience"
to justify the decision. In addition, the Commission argued that the
beneficiary's participation in a procedure and its experience in a particular
market allowed it to understand the Commission's decision. The Court
rejected these arguments and annulled the Commission's sloppy decision.
In SIM 2 Multimedia SpA, as indicated above, the Commission
considered it irrelevant that the shares of a company, that benefited from
unlawful State aid, were apparently sold at market price by its shareholder
to a third party.58 The matter concerned the Commission's attempt at
recovering aid from the beneficiary. The Commission's reasons were
insufficient to establish that the seller of the shares had not retained the
benefit of the aid received from the sale of its shares at market price. The
ECJ annulled the Commission's decision on this point.
B. Statement of Reasons Regarding Exemption Decisions by the
Commission
The ECJ considers that the Commission has wide discretion regarding
exemption decisions.5 9 Judicial review is confined to establishing that the
rules of procedure and the rules relating to the duty to give reasons are
satisfied, to verify the accuracy of the facts relied on and that there has been
57 Joined Cases T-228/99 and T-233/99, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and
Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Commission, (Mar. 6, 2003), at http://www.europa.eu.int/
servlet/portail/CuriaServlet?curiaLink=%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D79969693T 19990228
%26model%3Ddoc curia.
58 Italian Republic, at paras. 83-85 (May 8, 2003), at http://www.europa.eu.int/
servlet/portail/CuriaServlet?curiaLink=-%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D79969491 C 19990328
%26model%3Ddoccuria.
59 See e.g., Case C-225/91, Matra SA v. Commission, 1993 E.C.R. 1-3203, at paras. 24-
25.
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no error of law, manifest error of assessment of facts or misuse of powers.
In Kingdom of Spain v Commission, the Commission did not
characterize aid as investment or operating aid, as requested by the
Guidelines on environmental aid. 60  The ECJ found this to constitute a
breach of the Commission's obligation to explain clearly and
unambiguously the reasoning followed, to enable interested parties to take
cognizance of the justifications for the measure for the purpose of
defending their rights and to enable the courts to exercise their powers of
review. 6' The Court therefore annulled the Commission's decision.
V. OTHER PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
An entity granting or receiving aid may sometimes be in a dominant
position. In such cases, there may be a hesitation as to the most appropriate
"cause of action." In a recent judgment, the ECJ expressly stated that "the
fact that allocation by the State to a public undertaking of a significant
proportion of certain charges constitutes State aid does not preclude that
allocation from also giving rise to abuse of a dominant position by that
undertaking, contrary to Articles 86 and 90 of the Treaty. 62
The ECJ already clarified that the Commission cannot be required to
take into account amendments made to aid during an administrative
procedure (i.e., during a Commission investigation into the alleged aid).63
The CFI has recently added that the Commission may take into account an
alteration to an agreement effected during its inquiry, at least when the
original agreement and its alteration constitute a single grant of aid.64 The
Commission can broaden its review, but cannot be forced to do so.
The Commission has published a draft regulation implementing
Regulation 659/1999, the general State aid procedural regulation.6 ' The
draft Regulation includes a provision making the use of compulsory
notification forms necessary for the validity of notifications, rules on the
calculation of procedural time limits and a method for the fixing of interest





62 Enirisorse SpA, at para. 50 (Nov. 7, 2002), at http://www.europa.eu.int/
servlet/portail/CuriaServlet?curiaLink=%261ang%3DEN%26ident%3D79978892C 19010037
%26model%3Ddoc curia.
63 Joined Cases C-15/98 & C-105/99, Italian Republic and Sardegna Lines - Servizi
Marittimi della Sardegna SpA v. Commission, 2000 O.J. (C 372) 1, at paras. 42-43.
64 P & 0 European Ferries, 2003 O.J. (C 251) 10, at para. 58.
65 See European Commission, Commission Regulation Implementing Council Regulation
(EC) No 659/1999, at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/stateaid/others/
proceduralrules/implementingregulationen.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
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rates and the calculation of interests due on the recovery of unlawful aid.
The Commission is contemplating the adoption of the Regulation in early
2004.
VI. SUMMARY
Once considered the ugly duckling of E.U. competition law, State aid
is rapidly becoming a growing and dynamic source of work for practitioners
and regulators alike. As demonstrated above, the field is becoming
increasingly complex and nuanced. This has resulted in a great deal of
uncertainty among both aid givers and recipients alike as to the legality of
actual and contemplated assistance. It is hoped that the Commission will
enter into a dialogue with the Member States and the private sector in an
effort to further codify and clarify the boundaries of permitted versus
unlawful giving. Introducing a greater element of certainty and
predictability to this field will reduce the Commission's (and the Courts')
case load and allow it to focus its resources on those cases that pose the
greatest risk to distorting competition in the European market.
